

Message Text

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EA-10 EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USINT HAVANA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 217664

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) - US/USSR CONSUL-
TATIONS ON CD MEMBERSHIP

REF: A) STATE 206907 D) LONDON 13287
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B) GENEVA 12180 E) LONDON 12472
C) PARIS 27616

1. SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER COUNSELOR A.A. BESSMERTNYKH
CAME IN AUGUST 24, AT OUR REQUEST, TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON
THE CD MEMBERSHIP QUESTION WITH MR. WARNKE, DIRECTOR,
US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY. THIS WAS THE

FIRST OFFICIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE QUESTION WITH THE SOVIETS SINCE US APPROACH TO SELECTION OF ADDITIONAL MEMBERS HAD BEEN DETERMINED. POINTS FROM US PRESENTATION AND SOVIET RESPONSE FOLLOW PARAS 2-5 BELOW.

2. TIMING - WARNKE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS WITH THE SELECTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND POINTED OUT THAT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE WAS MOUNTING FOR THE SELECTION OF ADDITIONAL MEMBERS TO BE CONCLUDED BY THE OPENING OF THE 33RD UNGA SEPTEMBER 19. HE STATED THAT THE US COULD SEE SOME ADVANTAGE TO CEDING TO THIS PRESSURE SO AS TO AVOID A POSSIBLE CONTROVERSY ON THIS

ISSUE AT THE UN. BESSMERTNYKH AGREED THAT, IF POSSIBLE, THE SELECTION SHOULD BE DONE BY SEPTEMBER 19.

3. NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL MEMBERS - WARNKE SAID THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THE SELECTION PROCESS BE HANDLED FAIRLY AND TO AVOID RESENTMENT. HE SAID THAT WE SUPPORTED A MODEST INCREASE, BUT WERE FLEXIBLE REGARDING WHETHER IT SHOULD BE 5 OR 8. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FOR INCLUDING EIGHT ADDITIONAL MEMBERS AND THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT EIGHT. BESSMERTNYKH REITERATED THE SOVIET OFFICIAL POSITON THAT ONLY FIVE ADDITIONAL MEMBERS BE INCLUDED BUT ADDED THAT IF 'BETWEEN THE FOUR' CONFIDENTIAL

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(I.E., US, UK, FRANCE AND USSR) EIGHT IS PREFERABLE, "WE COULD ACCEPT IT I'D THINK". FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, HE SAID THEY PREFERRED TO ,STICK WITH FIVE,.

4. SLATES - WARNKE PRESENTED THE INITIAL US SLATES WHICH CONSISTED OF AUSTRALIA, 1-NATO CANDIDATE, 1-AFRICA (ALGERIA), 1-LATIN AMERICAN (VENEZUELA), AND 1-ASIAN (INDONESIA) FOR FIVE ADDITIONAL MEMBERS PLUS ANOTHER AFRICAN (KENYA), ANOTHER LATIN AMERICAN (PANAMA) AND ONE EUROPEAN NEUTRAL (EITHER AUSTRIA OR SPAIN) FOR SLATE OF EIGHT. BESSMERTNYKH THEN PRESENTED THE OFFICIAL SOVIET SLATE OF FIVE: AUSTRALIA, FINLAND, ALGERIA, CUBA AND SRI LANKA: PLUS HE SPECULATED, PERHAPS INDONESIA, GHANA AND AUSTRIA FOR A SLATE OF EIGHT. HE STATED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FIRST, HOWEVER, TO GET AGREEMENT ON A CORE GROUP OF FIVE. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT INITIAL AGREEMENT ON FIVE OUT OF EIGHT WOULD PUT US "A LONG WAY TOWARD HOME".

5. CUBA VS. VENEZUELA - BESSMERTNYKH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THE USSR ATTACHED TO CUBAN MEMBERSHIP AND STATED THAT IF CUBA WERE ACCEPTED, THEN "THE OTHERS"

MIGHT WELL BE ACCEPTABLE TO MOSCOW. WARNKE ASKED IF HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT THE US-PROPOSED SLATE OF 5 (PARA 4 ABOVE) MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS IF THE US WOULD AGREE TO CUBAN MEMBERSHIP. BESSMERTNYKH REPLIED THAT IT WAS ONLY A PERSONAL THOUGHT. WARNKE THEN RE-ITERATED OUR STRONG PREFERENCE FOR VENEZUELA AND POINTED OUT THAT VENEZUELA HAD A "BETTER TRACK RECORD" IN DIS-ARMAMENT AND HAD CONTRIBUTED MORE TO ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS, WHILE CUBA HAD NOT. BESSMERTNYKH THEN STATED THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD NOT THINK MOSCOW WOULD ACCEPT A NATO CANDIDATE WITHOUT CUBA.

6. OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED FROM APPROACH OUTLINED JULY 10 IN GENEVA; HOWEVER, INDI-CONFIDENTIAL

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CATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE NUMBERS ISSUE AND POSSIBLE WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ACCEPTANCE OF BOTH AUSTRALIA AND A NATO CANDIDATE, IF US WILL RECONSIDER ACCEPTABILITY OF CUBAN CANDIDACY, LEAD US TO BELIEVE AGREEMENT ON A COMMON SLATE WILL SOON BE POSSIBLE. WE WERE ALSO ENCOURAGED BY LACK OF REFERENCE TO CUBA/AUSTRALIA LINK. WE BELIEVE THIS RELEFTS SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE BROAD SUPPORT AUSTRALIA ENJOYS AMONG ALL THE VARIOUS GROUPS AS WELL AS THE REALIZATION THAT, IN A SLATE OF EIGHT, THE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED COULD BE BETTER ACCOMMODATED.

7. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THE WOULD REPORT OUR CONSULTATIONS TO MOSCOW AND HOPED TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE US PRESENTATION IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

8. WE HAVE INFORMED THE BRITISH IN WASHINGTON OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE AUSTRALIA/CUBA LINKAGE HAD BEEN DROPPED AND BELIEVED THAT ONCE THE CUBA/NATO ISSUE IS RESOLVED BETWEEN THE US AND USSR, AGREEMENT ON A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE SLATE WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT. FURTHERMORE, LEAVING ASIDE THE CUBA ISSUE, THE US AND UK NOW SEEM TO SUPPORT A COMMON SLATE OF CANDIDATES: AUSTRALIA, 1-NATO, (BRITISH APPEAR TO BE LEANING TOWARD BELGIUM), 1-EUROPEAN NEUTRAL (AUSTRIA, SPAIN, FINLAND), ALGERIA, KENYA, VENEZUELA AND EITHER INDONESIA OR SRI LANKA.

9. FOR PARIS: IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 6 REP A, PLEASE INFORM FRENCH OF US/USSR CONSULTATIONS OF AUGUST 24, DRAWING ON POINTS CONTAINED PARAS 1-7. EMBASSY MAY ALSO CONVEY UK REACTION (PARA 8) AND INFORM FRENCH OF US/UK CONFIDENTIAL

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AGREEMENT EMERGING ON CANDIDACIES. CHRISTOPHER

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